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JUS PRO BELLO: 
THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTIONS ON WAR 
CONTINUATION 
 
Marco Bocchese† 
 
Abstract:  This Article investigates the political and military conditions under 
which national governments decide to invite judicial scrutiny from the International Crim-
inal Court (“ICC”).  The cross-case analysis of seven countries either examined or offi-
cially investigated by the ICC Prosecutor’s Office (“OTP”) lends support to the conclusion 
that governments solicit external judicial scrutiny due to two main independent variables:  
namely, a military’s inability to defeat a rebellion and a short-term preference for continu-
ing war over negotiating its conclusion.  This Article contends that the values placed on 
these variables combine to persuade national governments in conflict-ridden countries that, 
against predictions to the contrary, inviting ICC scrutiny is in fact in their best interest.  
This Article also makes a threefold contribution to the lasting debate on peace versus jus-
tice.  First, it emphasizes state agency in the processes of norm exploitation and subversion.  
Second, it sheds new light on the tactical use of international laws in the pursuit of broader 
state strategies.  Third, it identifies political and military conditions for the optimal tactical 
use of international laws.  In all, this Article highlights the instrumentality of international 
laws in prolonging, rather than bringing to an end, internal conflict.  In so doing, it urges 
scholars and practitioners to rethink the relationship between the concepts of “justice” and 
“peace,” for the former can be used to undercut the latter. 
 
Cite as:  Marco Bocchese, Jus Pro Bello: The Impact of International Prosecutions on War 
Continuation, 27 WASH. INT’L L.J. 645 (2018). 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
States use international norms and laws in the pursuit of extralegal ends.  
Far from a provocation, the foregoing statement is regarded today as true by 
diplomats, foreign policy pundits, and academics alike.1  Political scientists, 
for instance, have explored how, and to what ends, both state and non-state 
actors manipulate norms and legal provisions. 2   In brief, as international 
                                                 
†  Ph.D. candidate, Northwestern University (June 2018); LL.M. Northwestern University (2010); J.D. 
University of Verona, Italy (2007). For helpful comments on previous drafts, I would like to thank William 
Reno and Jahara “Franky” Matisek. Financial assistance from Northwestern University’s Program of African 
Studies, the Buffett Institute for Global Studies and the Dispute Resolution Research Center at the Kellogg 
School of Management is gratefully acknowledged. For excellent editorial assistance, I thank Alexandra 
Wilson. 
1 Political scientists generally accept “the definition of a norm as a standard of appropriate behavior 
for actors with a given identity.” Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and 
Political Change, 52 INT’L ORG. 887, 891 (1998). 
2 On the strategic use of norms and laws, see generally Ian Hurd, The Strategic Use of Liberal Inter-
nationalism: Libya and the UN Sanctions, 1992–2003, 59 INT’L ORG. 495 (2005); Kenneth A. Rodman & 
Petie Booth, Manipulated Commitments: The International Criminal Court in Uganda, 35 HUM. RTS. Q. 271 
(2013); Marco Bocchese, Odd Friends: Rethinking the Relationship Between the ICC and State Sovereignty, 
49 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 339 (2017). 
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politics become increasingly entangled in treaties and other legal instruments, 
both state and non-state actors have regarded international law (“IL”) as 
instrumental in the pursuit of foreign policy goals, and thus integral to the 
logic behind conducting international affairs.3  Similarly, legal experts and 
scholars have acknowledged the systematic use of international law for 
extralegal ends.  A new term—“lawfare”—was coined to conceptualize the 
new logic at play.4  This term has proven useful in that it defines instances 
whereby state and non-state actors resort to IL provisions and institutions for 
their military or political byproducts, rather than their intended legal effects.  
The International Criminal Court (“ICC)” has played an increasingly central 
role within this ongoing global trend, referred to as the “legalization” of 
international politics. 5  The ICC’s prominence in “waging lawfare” is a 
function of its potentially unlimited temporal and territorial jurisdiction, as 
well as the shift from state to individual criminal accountability that its 
establishment enabled.6 
 
This Article explores the political and military conditions under which 
national governments invite judicial scrutiny from the ICC.  The academic 
payoff of undertaking such a study, as well as its intended contribution to the 
field of international law and politics, is threefold.  First, it sheds new light on 
the systematic exploitation and subversion of the ICC—hereby conceived of 
as both a legal regime and international organization—for extralegal 
purposes.  More specifically, this Article reveals that government decisions to 
“outsource” criminal jurisdiction to independent third parties do not happen 
randomly.  Rather, national governments conceive of this possibility as an 
alternative course of action to conflict-resolution efforts.  Second, a better 
understanding of why governments invite external judicial scrutiny must start 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., Ian Hurd, The International Rule of Law: Law and the Limit of Politics, 28 ETHICS & INT’L 
AFF. 39 (2014). The strategic exploitation of legal provisions speaks to the broader state use of multilateral 
institutions and organizations, commonly referred to as soft or institutional balancing. See Robert A. Pape, 
Soft Balancing Against the United States, 30 INT’L SECURITY 7 (2005); T.V. Paul, Soft Balancing in the Age 
of US Primacy, 30 INT’L SECURITY 46 (2005). 
4 In Charles Dunlap’s authoritative definition, lawfare is “the strategy of using—or misusing—law as 
a substitute for traditional military means to achieve an operational objective.” Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Lawfare 
Today: A Perspective, 3 YALE J. INT’L AFF. 146, 146 (2008). 
5 See Ryder McKeown, International Law and Its Discontents: Exploring the Dark Sides of Interna-
tional Law in International Relations, 43 REV. INT’L STUD. 430, 436 (2017). See generally LEGALIZATION 
AND WORLD POLITICS (Judith L. Goldstein et al. eds., 2001). 
6 See, e.g., Alana Tiemessen, The International Criminal Court and the Lawfare of Judicial Interven-
tion, 30 INT’L REL. 409 (2016); Kirsten J. Fisher & Cristina G. Stefan, The Ethics of International Criminal 
‘Lawfare,’ 16 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 237, 244–49 (2016); Kate Cronin-Furman, Managing Expectations: In-
ternational Criminal Trials and the Prospects for Deterrence of Mass Atrocity, 7 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL 
JUST. 434, 437, 441 (2013). 
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with the identification of the political and military conditions in which said 
decisions occur.  Third, a cross-case analysis of seven countries shows there 
is more to these decisions than state leaders’ self-interest.  Establishing 
whether or not to invite external judicial scrutiny is a complex decision for 
state leaders, but adopting an individual level of analysis unduly narrows our 
understanding of the underlying decision-making processes.  Hence, shifting 
the level of analysis from individual to state offers a more fine-grained picture 
of what is at stake when governments ask for ICC involvement in internal 
affairs.  To be clear, this is not tantamount to underestimating—let alone 
ignoring—the salience of state leaders’ self-interest and preferences.  On this 
point, there is a wealth of evidence supporting the claim that sitting heads of 
state, from Ugandan President Museveni to Congolese President Kabila, 
thought they would personally benefit from involving the ICC in domestic 
affairs.7  Yet, as this Article demonstrates, a state leader’s interest in retaining 
power is but one of several factors contributing to the decision to invite ICC 
scrutiny. 
 
In all, the logic of inviting external judicial scrutiny must be analyzed, 
and its efficacy assessed, in light of the broader military and political 
strategies states adopt.  These strategies reflect state preferences when coping 
with internal threats within an ever-tightening normative and institutional 
global governance structure.  Given this legalistic structure, the invitation of 
external judicial scrutiny amounts to a wartime tactic to which governments 
resort in the pursuit of their strategic goals.  Furthermore, the context wherein 
incumbent governments decide which strategy to pursue matters 
tremendously.  
 
On this point, some preliminary observations on the universe of cases 
highlight commonalities in seemingly heterogeneous situations.  First, 
governments invited external judicial scrutiny in situations where armed rebel 
groups contested their authority or posed a threat to their survival.  In many 
of such cases, governments had no control over large portions of national 
territory at the time they formally requested external judicial scrutiny.  
Second, the same governments proved unable to achieve military victory 
against the internal threats they confronted.  A military’s inability to quash a 
                                                 
7 See generally Paola Gaeta, Is the Practice of Self-Referrals a Sound Start for the ICC?, 2 J. INT’L 
CRIM. JUST. 949 (2004). On Uganda, see Sarah M. H. Nouwen & Wouter G. Werner, Doing Justice to the 
Political: The International Criminal Court in Uganda and Sudan, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 941, 949 (2010). On 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (“DRC”), see William W. Burke-White, Complementarity in Practice: 
The International Criminal Court as Part of a System of Multi-Level Global Governance in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, 18 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 557 (2005). 
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rebellion and win a war is one of the two independent variables that determine 
the likelihood of governments asking for external judicial scrutiny.  Lastly, 
external actors’ preferences must be taken into account as well, for they 
affect—albeit indirectly—the decision of governments to invite external 
judicial scrutiny or call for the establishment of new international courts 
(“ICs”).  As security scholars correctly point out, state-initiated brute force is 
seldom a viable, let alone uncontested, option in an increasingly legalized 
international system.8  
 
In fact, the international community has generally proven unwilling to 
pour sizable military, political, and economic resources into conflict 
management or resolution in peripheral countries, showing even less 
eagerness to intervene in Africa.9  Accordingly, major global players hold a 
marked preference for short-term solutions—solutions whose long-term 
validity is being increasingly questioned.  Calls for the immediate cessation 
of hostilities usually precede the deployment of peacekeepers and the 
brokering of inclusive power-sharing agreements aimed at giving rebel groups 
(and the people they allegedly represent) a stake in state affairs.10  Scholars 
noticed this “standardized” path to conflict resolution can have adverse 
consequences; in particular, it can incentivize non-state armed groups to use 
the escalation of violence as a method of obtaining a seat at the negotiating 
table. 11   As this three-party peacemaking process unfolds, it becomes 
increasingly clear that the likely loser is the state, whose sovereignty and 
authority global players readily sacrifice to appease the rebels. 
Unsurprisingly, national governments, as legitimate state representatives and 
acting sovereigns, resist externally sponsored power-sharing agreements that 
demean their standing and legitimize internal enemies as trustworthy partners 
in peace.12  Against this backdrop, national governments begin to rethink the 
invitation of external judicial scrutiny as a means to criminalize internal 
                                                 
8  ROBERT MANDEL, COERCING COMPLIANCE: STATE-INITIATED BRUTE FORCE IN TODAY'S WORLD 1 
(2015). 
9 See Nouwen & Werner, supra note 7, at 948; Mohammed Ayoob, Third World Perspectives on 
Humanitarian Intervention and International Administration, 10 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 99, 105–110 (2004); 
Denis M. Tull & Andreas Mehler, The Hidden Costs of Power-Sharing: Reproducing Insurgent Violence in 
Africa, 104 AFR. AFF. 375, 386 (2005). 
10 See Pierre Englebert & Denis M. Tull, Postconflict Reconstruction in Africa: Flawed Ideas About 
Failed States, 32 INT’L SECURITY 106 (2008); Roy Licklider, Ethical Advice: Conflict Management vs. Hu-
man Rights in Ending Civil Wars, 7 J. HUM. RTS. 376, 377 (2008). 
11 On this problem, see Stephen John Stedman, Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes, 22 INT’L SECU-
RITY 5, 5 (1997); WILLIAM RENO, WARFARE IN INDEPENDENT AFRICA 164 (2011). 
12 See Bocchese, supra note 2, at 358–61; Englebert & Tull, supra note 10, at 126. 
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enemies.  They do so in hopes of forestalling power-sharing agreements or 
undermining their implementation.13 
 
The remainder of this Article is organized as follows.  Part II surveys 
the literature on the strategic use of international laws and institutions.  The 
same section also engages with scholarly work on power-sharing in conflict-
ridden countries and suggests that state referrals (also referred to as “self-
referrals”) to the ICC are better conceived of as governmental responses to 
undesired external political or military interference in internal affairs.  Part III 
lays out the theoretical argument and outlines the research design and case 
selection.  Part IV compares seven countries’ situations pending before the 
ICC, demonstrating that the theory detailed in Part III translates easily across 
continents.  The Article concludes by highlighting the causal nexus between 
state-led processes of norm exploitation, norm subversion, and war 
continuation and, in so doing, contributes to the development of mid-level 
theories on state use of IL in the pursuit of extralegal objectives. 
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
To fully appreciate the tactical power of inviting external judicial 
scrutiny, this section offers a brief survey of the scholarship on issues relevant 
to the theoretical argument laid out below.  The first topic to be addressed is 
state agency in the processes of norm exploitation and subversion.  In other 
words, are state leaders cognizant of what the invitation of external judicial 
scrutiny entails, and what extralegal objectives can be achieved through its 
invitation?  On this point, Cambridge University lecturer on international law 
Sarah Nouwen argues that “the [Ugandan government] expected, and 
obtained, dividends from the intervention.” 14   On state co-optation of 
international laws and institutions, reader at the University of London School 
of Oriental and African Studies Phil Clark highlights the issue of (perceived) 
selectivity arising from the ICC Office of the Prosecutor’s (“OTP”) choice to 
investigate only crimes allegedly committed by the Lord’s Resistance Army 
                                                 
13 See Bocchese, supra note 2, at 356; see also Julian Ku & Jide Nzelibe, Do International Criminal 
Tribunals Deter or Exacerbate Humanitarian Atrocities?, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 777, 828 (2006); Adam 
Branch, Uganda’s Civil War and the Politics of ICC Intervention, 21 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 179, 183 (2007). 
14 SARAH M. H. NOUWEN, COMPLEMENTARITY IN THE LINE OF FIRE: THE CATALYSING EFFECT OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT IN UGANDA AND SUDAN 114 (2013). On the DRC situation, see Burke-
White, supra note 7, at 559; Thomas O. Hansen, Africa and the International Criminal Court, in HANDBOOK 
OF AFRICA’S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 171 (Tim Murithi ed., 2014). 
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(“LRA”), but not from state armed forces.15  For others, state invitation of ICC 
scrutiny was instrumental in criminalizing the LRA, undermining peace talks, 
and marginalizing domestic and international actors pushing for political 
solutions. 16   These arguments do not apply exclusively to Uganda, for 
prominent legal scholars have noticed “striking similarities” with both 
Democratic Republic of Congo (“DRC”) and Central African Republic 
(“CAR”) self-referrals and, more recently, the declaration under Article 12(3) 
of the Rome Statute lodged by the government of Côte d’Ivoire in April of 
2003.17 
 
The second topic of interest is the link between power-sharing 
agreements and state invitation of external judicial scrutiny.  Colby College 
professor of government Kenneth Rodman and his former student Petie 
Booth, whose work lies at the crossroads between international law and 
conflict studies, note that “negotiated resolutions of civil wars are most likely 
when there is a ‘mutually hurting stalemate’ in which all of the parties 
recognize that they cannot win and will be worse off the longer the war 
continues.”18  Stalemates have become the rule rather than the exception as 
definitive victories in both interstate and civil wars have declined in number.19  
That so many wars end in draws today is likely due not only to the military 
weakness of national armies, but also to other factors such as the technologies 
of rebellion or geography. 20   Lastly, this author argues that incumbent 
governments invite ICC scrutiny to either forestall or undermine externally 
imposed power-sharing accords.21 
 
                                                 
15 Phil Clark, Law, Politics and Pragmatism: The ICC and Case Selection in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo and Uganda, in COURTING CONFLICT? JUSTICE, PEACE AND THE ICC IN AFRICA 37, 42 (Nicholas 
Waddell & Phil Clark eds., 2008); see also Asad G. Kiyani, Third World Approaches to International Crim-
inal Law, 109 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 255, 255 (2015). On the DRC situation, see Felix Mukwiza 
Ndahinda, The Bemba-Banyamulenge Case Before the ICC: From Individual to Collective Criminal Respon-
sibility, 7 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 476, 491 (2013). 
16 See generally Payam Akhavan, The Lord’s Resistance Army Case: Uganda’s Submission of the 
First State Referral to the International Criminal Court, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 403 (2005); Nouwen & Werner, 
supra note 7; Hans Peter Schmitz, Rebels Without a Cause? Transnational Diffusion and the Lord’s Re-
sistance Army (LRA), 1986–2011, in TRANSNATIONAL DYNAMICS OF CIVIL WAR 120–48 (Jeffrey T. Checkel, 
ed., 2013). 
17 See Rodman & Booth, supra note 2, at 296; Bocchese, supra note 2, at 360. 
18 Rodman & Booth, supra note 2, at 293; see also Tull & Mehler, supra note 9, at 386. 
19 See Tanisha M. Fazal, The Demise of Peace Treaties in Interstate War, 67 INT’L ORG. 695, 706 
(2013). 
20 See Maria Eriksson Baaz & Judith Verweijen, The Volatility of a Half-Cooked Bouillabaisse: Rebel-
Military Integration and Conflict Dynamics in the Eastern DRC, 112 AFR. AFF. 563, 578–79 (2013). 
21 Bocchese, supra note 2, at 358–61. 
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On foreign interference in internal conflicts, Jack Snyder and Robert 
Jervis, two prominent international relations scholars at Columbia University, 
conclude that “powerful outsiders” acting like guarantors are almost necessary 
for reaching a political solution to end civil wars.22  Foreign preference for—
if not obsession with—conflict management explains why “[p]olitical power-
sharing agreements have become an almost standard ingredient of negotiated 
settlements to civil wars in Africa, as elsewhere.”23  On the one hand, this 
attitude is the backbone of short-term initiatives aimed at stopping violence.24 
On the other hand, it reveals both a preference for low-cost political options 
and a lack of commitment to creating conditions for lasting peace.25  The 
limits intrinsic to this approach of conflict management are known to the 
proponents of power-sharing agreements, for they regard political solutions 
engineered to reduce the security dilemma as second-best solutions.26 
 
Finally, a brief mention of the politics of conflict management is due.  
A long-known criticism of power-sharing is that it “reifies the contending 
groups”27 because “external mediators . . . conceive all the parties [to a civil 
conflict] as subsisting on a more or less equal footing.”28  Rebel groups are 
well aware that peace negotiations greatly enhance their international 
standing29 and, accordingly, are becoming increasingly proficient in the art of 
diplomacy—formerly the exclusive domain of state actors.30  Bearing in mind 
the enmity between negotiating parties and the external pressures exerted on 
them, it might not be surprising that “most negotiated peace agreements fail 
during the implementation phase.”31  Government and non-state armed groups 
have different reasons for defecting, but a thorough analysis of such reasons 
is beyond the scope of this Article.  However, one overlooked and 
understudied way in which incumbent governments undertake to sabotage 
                                                 
22 Jack Snyder & Robert Jervis, Civil War and the Security Dilemma, in CIVIL WARS, INSECURITY, 
AND INTERVENTION 15, 19 (Barbara F. Walter & Jack Snyder eds., 1999); see also Séverine Autesserre, 
Hobbes and the Congo: Frames, Local Violence, and International Intervention, 63 INT’L ORG. 249, 250 
(2009). 
23 Eriksson Baaz & Verweijen, supra note 20, at 564. For a list of African peace agreements since 
1999, see Andreas Mehler, Peace and Power Sharing in Africa: A Not So Obvious Relationship, 108 AFR. 
AFF. 453, 457–61 (2009). 
24 See Licklider, supra note 10, at 377. 
25 See Tull & Mehler, supra note 9, at 395; Mehler, supra note 23, at 455. 
26 See Snyder & Jervis, supra note 22, at 19. 
27 Id. 
28 Christopher Clapham, Degrees of Statehood, 24 REV. INT’L STUD. 143, 153 (1998). 
29 Id. at 153; see also Bridget L. Coggins, Rebel Diplomacy: Theorizing Violent Non-State Actors’ 
Strategic Use of Talk, in REBEL GOVERNANCE IN CIVIL WAR 98–99 (Ana Arjona et al. eds., 2016). 
30 See Coggins, supra note 29, at 98–99. 
31 Autesserre, supra note 22, at 250. 
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peace talks is to co-opt international criminal tribunals (“ICTs”) in the 
criminalization of their enemies so as to strip them of their newly bestowed 
legitimacy. 
 
III. THEORETICAL ARGUMENT 
 
International criminal law (“ICL”) and ICTs have changed the 
landscape of modern warfare in ways policymakers and treaty drafters never 
could have foreseen.  The aim of this Article is not to assess whether the 
aforementioned change represents a major or minor development in twenty-
first century military affairs; rather, it purports to illustrate how the 
introduction of these IL institutions has affected state decision-making by 
ushering in wartime tactics which were previously unavailable.  To be clear, 
lawfare is not an option to which states should resort if maximizing the impact 
of external judicial scrutiny is their intent.  Moreover, it is worth recalling that 
not all state leaders who decide to invite ICC scrutiny fully understand the 
implications of doing so beforehand.  That said, identical political and military 
conditions have underpinned five instances of self-referrals (Uganda in 2003, 
the DRC in 2004, the CAR in 2004 and 2014, and Mali in 2012), as well as 
five instances of declarations of ad hoc acceptance of ICC jurisdiction under 
Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute (Côte d’Ivoire in 2003, Palestine in 2009 
and 2015, and Ukraine in 2014 and 2015).  Put differently, seven countries 
from three different continents presented the same conditions at the time their 
governments invited ICC scrutiny.  Extracting general rules by way of 
induction always calls for caution, yet the fact that identical conditions were 
at play across a very diverse pool of countries suggests incumbent and future 
governments can learn from past episodes of invitation of external judicial 
scrutiny.  
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Table 1: The Logic of Inviting External Judicial Scrutiny 
 Preference for Peace Preference for War 
Ability to Win the War 
Political Settlement 
or State Acquiescence 
War Continuation 
Inability to Win the War Government Survival 
Invitation of External 
Judicial Scrutiny 
  
Table 1 illustrates both the novelty introduced by state invitation of 
external judicial scrutiny and the alternatives to the latter if and when the 
underlying conditions vary.  All the aforementioned situations were in the 
lower-right quadrant at the time their governments formally invited ICC 
scrutiny.  A few remarks on how to correctly read Table 1:  first, it offers an 
overview—not a taxonomy—of the alternative tactics national governments 
can employ under different conditions.  In other words, governments are not 
limited by the tactical options listed in Table 1, which nevertheless maps their 
adoption in accordance with how the two independent variables—i.e. military 
ability and state preferences—combine.  Second, Table 1 allows for 
movement from one quadrant to another as change in either government 
preferences or military ability occurs.  For instance, the Ugandan government 
held constant its preference for war over time, yet it changed tactics depending 
on whether or not the LRA was within or beyond reach due to geography.  
Lastly, this study’s focus on the conditions underpinning state invitation of 
external judicial scrutiny allows the bracketing of endogeneity problems.  
Indeed, it is fair to argue that a military’s ability to win a conflict may affect 
state preference for war, while state preference for peace may avert—or 
stop—military build-up (Table 1’s upper-right and lower-left quadrants).  
Still, this study is exclusively interested in explaining one particular—and to 
some extent counterintuitive—combination of the two independent variables.  
As far as the outcome of interest (i.e. state invitation of external judicial 
scrutiny) is concerned, endogeneity problems are successfully bracketed by 
the fact that national governments held a preference for continuing war over 
negotiating its conclusion despite their inability to win by military means. 
 
It is now time to ask why the systematic state invitation of external 
judicial scrutiny is a noteworthy novelty and, relatedly, what it adds to the 
mainstream understanding of international law and politics.  First, ICs—and 
ICTs in particular—provide national governments with an institutional 
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avenue in which to overcome—to a certain extent, at least—military realities, 
and fend off external pressures to cease hostilities and enter peace 
negotiations.32  Put another way, before ICs were co-opted into state strategies 
of resistance, Table 1’s lower-right quadrant was blank and national 
governments, willing but unable to prolong hostilities, could only resort to 
diplomatic initiatives.  Second, state invitation of external judicial scrutiny 
affords a readily available and surprisingly effective credible commitment 
mechanism:  a lesson Ugandan president Museveni learned the hard way when 
he considered rewarding the LRA’s demobilization with amnesty for its 
leaders.  In response to this suggestion, former ICC Chief Prosecutor Moreno-
Ocampo clarified he “could not use his discretion to suspend the arrest 
warrants, which were non-negotiable.”33  ICC scholars have thus far neglected 
this aspect of self-referrals, overlooking the application of the credible 
commitment mechanism to war continuation and not just to war termination.  
Third, state invitation of external judicial scrutiny adds another tool to the 
state’s arsenal of non-violent wartime tactics.34  As with many other wartime 
tactics, moreover, the underlying political and military conditions prompt its 
adoption and predict its efficacy in the pursuit of broader strategic objectives. 
 
Not all governments who are willing but unable to continue fighting 
necessarily invite external judicial scrutiny, yet all governments that 
eventually decided to do so were willing but unable to sustain their military 
efforts at the time they formally requested it.  But what are the alternatives to 
this Article’s outcome of interest, i.e. Table 1’s lower right quadrant?  The 
remainder of this section offers a brief overview of the potential change-
determined outcomes in one or both independent variables.  First, 
governments who have both the will and means to sustain military efforts may 
resist pressures to negotiate a political solution to the conflict and continue 
fighting (upper-right quadrant), as the case of Sri Lanka aptly illustrates.35  To 
defeat the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (“LTTE”) rebellion and end 
twenty-five years of civil war, the Sri Lankan government allegedly employed 
military tactics that quite blatantly violated international humanitarian law 
                                                 
32 On the conceptualization of lawfare as the weapon of the (militarily) weak, see Fisher & Stefan, 
supra note 6, at 240, 243. 
33 Kenneth A. Rodman, Justice as a Dialogue Between Law and Politics: Embedding the International 
Criminal Court Within Conflict Management and Peacebuilding, 12 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 437, 459 (2014). 
34 See Fisher & Stefan, supra note 6, at 240. 
35 For a detailed account of the Sri Lankan Civil War dynamics, see ZACHARIAH C. MAMPILLY, REBEL 
RULERS: INSURGENT GOVERNANCE AND CIVILIAN LIFE DURING WAR 93–128 (2011); see generally Sumit 
Ganguly, Ending the Sri Lankan Civil War, 147 DÆDALUS 78 (2018). 
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(“IHL” or “laws of war”) provisions.36  On May 18, 2009, upon defeating the 
remaining LTTE resistance and killing top-ranked rebel officials, the Sri 
Lankan armed forces declared total victory and government control over the 
entire island.37 
 
Second, the incumbent’s short-term outlook can be so negative that its 
survival requires co-opting the rebellion(s) into national unified power-
sharing governments (lower-left quadrant).  There is no shortage of recent 
examples for this outcome, including Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995), Sierra 
Leone (1999), Burundi (2000), Côte d’Ivoire (2002), the DRC (2002–2003), 
and Kenya (2008).38  It is also worth noting that power-sharing agreements 
are often sponsored (when not de facto imposed) by political patrons or 
international organizations—an interference that curtails state agency in the 
critical decision-making process on war termination.39 
 
Finally, incumbents may prefer non-military solutions to the conflict 
despite having the military capability to defeat the enemy in combat (upper-
right quadrant).  Cases belonging to this quadrant include situations wherein 
the incumbent seeks either short-term (e.g., ceasefire) or long-term (e.g., 
peace treaty) political solutions to an ongoing conflict.  At present, Colombia 
exemplifies a country whose armed forces enjoy overwhelming military 
superiority over active left-wing rebellions (namely the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia—known by their Spanish acronym, FARC—and the 
National Liberation Army—known by their Spanish acronym, ELN), but 
whose national government favors peace negotiations over war 
continuation.40  Colombia is also a fitting example in that political, ethical, 
and legal considerations shaped government preferences on conflict 
resolution.  On this point, Colombian military and procurement officers, when 
                                                 
36 See Rodman & Booth, supra note 2, at 274 n.15; see also Wasana Punyasena, The Facade of Ac-
countability: Disappearances in Sri Lanka, 23 BOS. C. THIRD WORLD L. J. 115, 132–33 (2003). 
37 See Timeline: Sri Lanka’s 25-Year Civil War, REUTERS, May 18, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/ar-
ticle/us-srilanka-war-timeline-sb-idUSTRE54F16620090518. 
38  On all of the African examples listed above, see Tull & Mehler, supra note 9, at 375–96. On Burundi 
and the DRC, see René Lemarchand, Consociationalism and Power Sharing in Africa: Rwanda, Burundi, 
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 106 AFR. AFF. 1, 7–14 (2006). On Bosnia specifically, see Ulrich 
Schneckener, Making Power-Sharing Work: Lessons from Successes and Failures in Ethnic Conflict Regu-
lation, 39 J. PEACE RES. 203, 209–10 (2002). 
39 On the increased popularity of internationally-sponsored power-sharing agreements in Africa, see 
Tull & Mehler, supra note 9, at 386; Matthew I. Mitchell, Power-sharing and Peace in Côte d’Ivoire: Past 
Examples and Future Prospects, 12 CONFLICT, SECURITY & DEV. 171, 178–79 (2012). 
40 Breanne Hataway, The FARC's Drug Trafficking as Political Crime: Determining the Success of 
Colombia's Peace Talks, 41 N.C. J. INT'L L. 163, 169, 170 (2015).  
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interviewed in fall 2016, affirmed that, from a purely military viewpoint, the 
armed forces could achieve total victory over the aforementioned rebel 
groups. 41   However, military victory becomes impossible to attain once 
political, ethical, and legal considerations are brought back into the picture.  
A war-winning strategy would likely entail not just the escalation of violence 
in a low-intensity conflict, but also employing tactics that would likely lead 
to gross violations of IHL norms.  But the case of Colombia may well be the 
exception rather than the rule.42 
 
When national governments want to pause, but not to settle, an ongoing 
conflict, buying time can be a useful tactic.  For instance, a ceasefire 
agreement can provide both the opportunity to test the enemy’s credibility as 
a potential partner in peace, as well as time to engage foreign actors and 
possibly win their support in hopes of altering the balance of power among 
warring parties.43  Ceasefire agreements can, at times, lead to lasting peace,44 
yet this Article is interested in the short-term suspension of hostilities, after 
which war can either resume or not.  Recent examples of ceasefire agreements 
include those brokered in South Sudan (January, August, and November 
2015), Ukraine (February 2015), Mali (June 2015), Myanmar (October 2015), 
and Libya (December 2015).45 
 
Another country deserving membership in this category is Nigeria, 
despite the fact that its domestic situation is quite different from Colombia’s.  
With 80,000 active military soldiers and 82,000 paramilitary, “Nigeria retains 
                                                 
41  Interview with a member of the armed forces, in Bogotá, Colombia (Nov. 9, 2017); Interview with 
a member of an administrative executive agency, in Bogotá, Colombia (Nov. 18, 2016).  
42 Interview with a senior member of the armed forces, in Bogotá, Colombia (Nov. 15, 2017). 
43 On this point Mateja Peter notices that “[p]eacekeepers are now often protecting states,” thus sur-
rendering their nominal impartiality. Mateja Peter, Between Doctrine and Practice: The UN Peacekeeping 
Dilemma, 21 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 351, 357 (2015). Rebels have also used ceasefire agreements to reor-
ganize and rearm. See Coggins, supra note 29, at 106. On ceasefire agreements and the prospect of durable 
peace, see generally VIRGINIA P. FORTNA, PEACE TIME: CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENTS AND THE DURABILITY OF 
PEACE (2004). 
44  See, e.g., Anna Jarstad et al., Peace Agreements in the 1990s – What Are the Outcomes 20 Years 
Later?, UMEÅ WORKING PAPERS IN PEACE & CONFLICT STUD., Dec. 2015, at 2, https://pdfs.seman-
ticscholar.org/0973/8bb3086c0db9a8708dff13a9768f51c776f9.pdf (mentioning Namibia and Guatemala as 
success stories).  
45 See Peace Agreements Database Search, UNITED NATIONS PEACEMAKER, http://peace-
maker.un.org/document-search?keys=cease-fire&field_padate_value%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate 
%5D=2015&field_pacountry_tid=. 
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the best-funded and -equipped forces in West Africa.”46  Nigeria at once faces 
distinct security challenges and contributes around 5000 troops to nine 
peacekeeping missions throughout the African continent.47  Yet countries like 
Nigeria may have a (temporary) interest in diverting human and financial 
resources away from one internal threat to deal with another—a tactic referred 
to as “state acquiescence” in Table 1.48  When the Nigerian government, in 
partnership with regional allies, launched major offensives against Boko 
Haram, as it did during 2015, “the number of Boko Haram attacks in the 
region . . . declined significantly.”49  In all, the example of Nigeria illustrates 
how variations in short-term preferences (e.g., peace versus war) explain the 
back-and-forth movement from one quadrant to another on Table 1. 
 
A. Research Design and Case Selection: Military (In)ability to 
Win a War 
 
Military (in)ability to win a war is determined by the capability of state 
armed forces and paramilitaries to achieve key wartime objectives in a 
specific operating environment.50  Military victory, in turn, is achieved either 
by quashing the enemy or capturing the territory under its control.  For most 
selected cases, the main threat to government survival was internal rather than 
external.  Incumbent governments have an ontological desire to stamp out 
sovereign competition and reassert control over areas that have fallen under 
rebel rule.  Borrowing from Oxford professor Stathis N. Kalyvas’ 
conceptualization of civil wars as processes of competition over sovereignty,51 
this Article moves from the theoretical premise that national governments 
hold a long-term preference for uncontested sovereignty over their entire 
national territory. 
                                                 
46 Sub-Saharan Africa, 113 MILITARY BALANCE 477, 524 (2013) [hereinafter IISS 2013]. Figures from 
subsequent volumes of The Military Balance show a steady increase from 2013 to 2017. See, e.g., Sub-Sa-
haran Africa, 117 MILITARY BALANCE 479, 528 (2017) [hereinafter IISS 2017] (listing 118,000 total active 
military soldiers). 
47  Id. at 524–25. 
48 As further discussed in the next section, the term “peace” is defined in the negative, that is, merely 
as the absence of war. See, e.g., FORTNA, supra note 42, at 9. For a critique of said approach, see Paul F. 
Diehl, Exploring Peace: Looking Beyond War and Negative Peace, 60 INT’L STUD. Q. 1 (2016). 
49 IISS 2017, supra note 46, at 481. 
50 The Joint Chiefs of Staff defines capability as “[t]he ability to complete a task or execute a course 
of action under specified conditions and level of performance.” JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, CJCSI 5123.01G, 
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTRUCTION glossary, at GL-7 (2015). Prominent security scholar 
Stephen Biddle offers a different definition of military capability. In his words, (offensive) military capability 
is “the capacity to destroy the largest defensive force over the largest possible territory for the smallest at-
tacker casualties in the least time.” STEPHEN BIDDLE, MILITARY POWER: EXPLAINING VICTORY AND DEFEAT 
IN MODERN BATTLE 6 (2004). 
51 See STATHIS N. KALYVAS, THE LOGIC OF VIOLENCE IN CIVIL WAR 88–89 (2006). 
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But military inability is itself the synthesis of several distinct 
contributing factors, as Table 2 elucidates below.  Aside from the balance of 
power among warring parties, other exogenous factors can and do affect state 
armed forces’ likelihood of winning a war.  This Article therefore also 
examines the technology of rebellion, political geography, and foreign 
military assistance to active rebellions. 
 
The first—and most intuitive—factor at play is the balance of power 
among belligerents.  Simply put, state armies and pro-government militias 
may not be strong enough to defeat the enemy; it can be a matter of numbers 
(i.e. soldiers ready for deployment), military professionalism, the technology 
or availability of weapons, or any combination of these circumstances. 
 
The second factor determining military (in)ability is the technology of 
rebellion.  Some civil wars are fought conventionally,52 like the one kicked 
off in Côte d’Ivoire by the failed coup d’état of September 19, 2002; others 
are fought as irregular wars (or insurgencies).53  For example, the “hit-and-
run” tactic has historically informed LRA operations directed at both military 
and civilian targets. 54   Commonly employed when weaker forces attack 
stronger opponents, this tactic puts rapidity of movement before territorial 
conquest and control, causing damage to the opponent and then quickly 
withdrawing before the latter can retaliate. 
 
The third factor accounting for military (in)ability to win a war is 
political geography.  The notion that the size and shape of nations—alongside 
population distribution within national borders—pose both hurdles and 
opportunities for governments has long been integral to the study of 
comparative politics.55  The working definition of political geography herein 
                                                 
52 According to Stathis N. Kalyvas and Laia Balcells, “[i]n conventional wars, military confrontation 
is direct, either across well-defined front lines or between armed columns; clashes often take the form of set 
battles, trench warfare, and town sieges.” Stathis N. Kalyvas & Laia Balcells, International System and Tech-
nologies of Rebellion: How the End of the Cold War Shaped Internal Conflict, 104 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 415, 
419 (2010). 
53 Id. at 418 (“[i]rregular or guerrilla warfare is a technology of rebellion whereby the rebels privilege 
small, lightly armed bands operating in rural areas.”) (citing James D. Fearon & David D. Laitin, Ethnicity, 
Insurgency, and Civil War, 97 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 75, 75 (2003)). 
54 See Jude Kagoro, Competitive Authoritarianism in Uganda: The Not So Hidden Hand of the Mili-
tary, in DEMOCRATIZATION AND COMPETITIVE AUTHORITARIANISM IN AFRICA 160 (Matthijs Bogaards & 
Sebastian Elischer eds., 2016). On the inherent illegality of tactics employed in guerrilla warfare, see Cog-
gins, supra note 29, at 104. 
55 See, e.g., JEFFREY HERBST, STATES AND POWER IN AFRICA: COMPARATIVE LESSONS IN AUTHORITY 
AND CONTROL 145 (2000). 
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employed is broader than usual in that it includes “artificial” hurdles to 
government power broadcasting, like the buffer zone established through the 
deployment of peacekeepers in post-genocide Rwanda and post-coup Côte 
d’Ivoire.56  This addition is relevant in that the mainstream notion of political 
geography, while concerned with the state’s ability to broadcast power over a 
defined territory, neither considers nor is meant to apply to countries 
experiencing an internal conflict. 
 
The last factor is foreign military intervention or assistance.  In theory, 
foreign military intervention on the side of—or assistance to—the rebellion 
can alter meaningfully the balance of power between warring parties.  In 
practice, none of the domestic situations referred to ICTs were immune from 
some type of foreign military intervention or assistance to the rebellion.57  In 
other words, none of the situations listed in Table 2 were purely national 
matters, as civil conflicts were consistently internationalized, albeit to 
different degrees. 
 
Table 2: Military Inability and Factors at Play in ICC Country                
Situations 
 Balance 
of Power 
Technology of 
Rebellion 
Political 
Geography 
Foreign 
Assistance 
Uganda  ✔︎  ✔︎ 
DRC  ✔︎ ✔︎ ✔︎ 
CAR ✓  ✔︎ ✔︎ 
Mali ✔︎  ✔︎ ✔︎ 
Côte d’Ivoire ✔︎  ✔︎  
Ukraine ✔︎   ✔︎ 
Palestine ✔︎ N/A ✔︎  
 
 
                                                 
56 On the Rwanda case, see Adekeye Adebajo, The Revolt Against the West: Intervention and Sover-
eignty, 37 THIRD WORLD Q. 1187, 1193 (2016). 
57 On Russian intervention on the side of Eastern Ukrainian separatists, see Ivan Katchanovski, The 
Separatist War in Donbas: A Violent Break-Up of Ukraine?, 17 EUR. POL. & SOC’Y 473, 475 (2016). In 
CAR, for instance, both state forces and the rebellion sought and eventually received foreign military assis-
tance. Marielle Debos, Fluid Loyalties in a Regional Crisis: Chadian ‘Ex-Liberators’ in the Central African 
Republic, 107 AFR. AFF. 225, 227, 229 (2008). 
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B. State Tactical Preferences (Peace versus War) 
 
Military inability alone does not explain why incumbent governments 
turn to ICL norms and institutions to exacerbate, rather than settle, armed 
conflicts active within their national borders.  As noted earlier, adverse 
military realities should push state decision-makers in the opposite direction, 
making conflict resolution more likely to follow, not less.  Only by bringing 
in the second independent variable—namely state preference for prolonging 
hostilities—is it possible to account for the rationality and strategic purview 
of government decision-making.  From a methodological standpoint, inferring 
preferences is an inevitably risky endeavor when advancing causal claims.  To 
minimize the risk of doing so, this subsection sets forth a working definition 
of “state preferences,” narrows its application, and operationalizes the 
variable into empirically observable factors. 
 
It is worth recalling that the focus of this study is to explore and explain 
the seemingly odd and counterintuitive combination of political and military 
conditions underpinning state invitation of external judicial scrutiny, as 
illustrated in Table 1.  Consequently, this Article looks specifically at the 
short-term tactical preferences of states at the moment national authorities 
formally invite ICC scrutiny.  State preferences are inferred by and 
operationalized through public speeches, press releases, meeting minutes, 
government-issued documents, and state behavior.  To corroborate otherwise 
insufficient evidence, state preferences are best accounted for by a 
combination of statements and actions—as it happened for the Uganda 
referral—or a pattern of consistent action over time, like in the case of the 
Article 12(3) declaration submitted by the Ivorian government in April 2003. 
 
C. Case Selection 
 
The theoretical argument above draws primarily, albeit not exclusively, 
on past situations referred by national governments to the ICC through either 
a self-referral or a declaration of accepting the jurisdiction envisaged by 
Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute.  It is worth noting that not all self-referrals 
or Article 12(3) declarations are considered in this study, but only those that 
occurred in conflict or post-conflict countries.  Thus, the self-referrals 
submitted by the Union of the Comoros (2013) and Gabon (2016) are 
excluded on the ground that no armed conflict of any kind, whether intra- or 
interstate, high- or low-intensity, was ongoing in these countries at the time 
their governments invited ICC scrutiny.  Conversely, country situations like 
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Rwanda (1994) and Sierra Leone (2000–2002) fit into the theoretical 
framework, for they occurred at a historic juncture when ICTs had already 
become a reality, although established on an ad hoc, rather than permanent, 
basis.  These two situations are particularly salient for the argument laid out 
in the previous section because they show national governments realizing 
ICTs’ potential for norm subversion and exploitation before any such tribunal 
was established to adjudicate international crimes committed in their territory.  
In microeconomics terms, the demand for norm exploitation and subversion 
predated the supply of such norms. 
 
On what counts as an armed conflict—and in line with the ICC’s 
temporal and subject-matter jurisdiction—this Article looks at interstate, 
intrastate, and internationalized intrastate conflicts that were ongoing or broke 
out after July 1, 2002, when the Rome Statute entered into force.  To make 
sure all armed conflicts falling within this time period are duly considered for 
case-selection purposes, this Article relies on the Uppsala Conflict Data 
Program at the department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala 
University and the Center for the Study of Civil War at the Peace Research 
Institute Oslo (UCDP/PRIO) Armed Conflict Dataset (Version 4-2016—the 
latest available online at the time of submission).58  It is beyond the scope of 
this publication to map all conflicts listed in the abovementioned dataset; 
rather, this Article aims to demonstrate that all episodes of state-invited 
external judicial scrutiny occurred under the same conditions (see the bottom-
right quadrant of Table 1). 
 
IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 
A. Côte d’Ivoire 
 
The Ivorian Civil War officially broke out on September 19, 2002, 
when a loose coalition of non-state armed groups unsuccessfully attempted to 
overthrow President Laurent Gbagbo.59  While rebel forces failed to take over 
Abidjan and seize power, they nevertheless succeeded in taking control of the 
northern half of Côte d’Ivoire.60  The unpreparedness of the Ivorian armed 
                                                 
58  The original version of this dataset, widely used by researchers and policy makers alike, is described 
in Nils P. Gleditsch et al., Armed Conflict 1946–2001: A New Dataset, 39 J. PEACE RES. 615 (2002). 
59 Marco Wyss, The Gendarme Stays in Africa: France’s Military Role in Côte d’Ivoire, 3 AFR. CON-
FLICT & PEACEBUILDING REV. 81, 91 (2013). 
60 LAIA BALCELLS, RIVALRY AND REVENGE: THE POLITICS OF VIOLENCE DURING CIVIL WAR 154 
(2017). 
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forces in responding to the rebel sortie in Abidjan, let alone to the broader 
offensive carried out in the northern regions, speaks directly to their military 
inability.  In fall of 2002, Ivorian armed forces still remained loyal to 
Gbagbo’s predecessor, military ruler General Robert Guéï.  Gbagbo’s mistrust 
of state armed forces led him to rely on the presidential guard, the 
gendarmerie, and militiamen loyal to him because of clientelistic linkages.61  
It is also worth noting that, at that time, the Ivorian army was relatively small 
in comparison to other African standing armies addressed below, due to the 
Ivorian government’s lasting reliance on France for protection from external 
threats.62  Two more considerations are important to note.  First, the main 
rebellion’s estimated strength matched that of the Ivorian armed forces—a 
rare instance of balanced distribution of power between two sides.63  Second, 
the sudden deployment of peacekeepers from France and the Economic 
Community of West African States (“ECOWAS”) created a buffer zone and 
crystallized the initial balance of power, affording few opportunities for 
military confrontation between state and rebel forces.64 
 
Coerced by the French government into signing the Linas-Marcoussis 
agreement in late January 2003, Gbagbo actively undertook to sabotage the 
agreement’s implementation by any means available.65  From his perspective, 
                                                 
61 For the estimated strength of each service branch, see The Military Balance, 104 INT’L INST. FOR 
STRATEGIC STUD. 1, 231 (2004) [hereinafter IISS 2004]. For the purpose of this Article, clientelistic linkages 
consist in iterative dyadic relationships between patron and client whereby the former rewards the latter’s 
political loyalty with access to public goods and services in a situation characterized by resource scarcity. 
For a conceptualization of clientelism, see Allen Hicken, Clientelism, 14 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 289, 290 
(2011). For its application to—and effects on—military recruitment and discipline, see Philip Roessler, The 
Enemy Within: Personal Rule, Coups, and Civil War in Africa, 63 WORLD POL. 300, 304, 309–10 (2011). 
62 For a comparison between Côte d’Ivoire, the DRC, and Uganda, see IISS 204, supra note 61, at 231, 
248. On Côte d’Ivoire’s reliance on France for protection, see Maja Bovcon, France’s Conflict Resolution 
Strategy in Côte d’Ivoire and Its Ethical Implications, 11 AFR. STUD. Q. 1, 13 (2009); Daniel Chirot, The 
Debacle in Côte d’Ivoire, 17 J. DEMOCRACY 63, 70 (2006), PAUL COLLIER, WARS, GUNS AND VOTES: DE-
MOCRACY IN DANGEROUS PLACES 163–64 (2010). 
63 See IISS 2004, supra note 6611, at 231, 374. 
64 See Alex J. Bellamy & Paul D. Williams, The New Politics of Protection? Côte d’Ivoire, Libya and 
the Responsibility to Protect, 87 INT’L AFF. 825, 829 (2011); COLLIER, supra note 62, at 163–64. Moreover, 
it was arguably “the exceptionally quick intervention by West African and French troops that prematurely 
froze the 2002 civil war.” Mike McGovern, The Ivorian Endgame: Can Ouattara Rebuild a Shattered Coun-
try?, FOREIGN AFF. (Apr. 14, 2011), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67728/mike-mcgovern/the-
ivorian-endgame. 
65 On the Linas-Marcoussis agreement and its discontents, see Mike McGovern, Proleptic Justice: The 
Threat of Investigation as a Deterrent to Human Rights Abuses in Côte d’Ivoire, in MIRRORS OF JUSTICE: 
LAW AND POWER IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 67, 83 (Kamari M. Clarke & Mark Goodale eds., 2009); Abu 
Bakarr Bah, Democracy and Civil War: Citizenship and Peacemaking in Côte d’Ivoire, 109 AFR. AFF. 597, 
605–06 (2010); Glulia Piccolino, David Against Goliath in Côte d’Ivoire? Laurent Gbagbo’s War Against 
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inviting ICC scrutiny was but another method of pursuing this endeavor.66  
The short timeline of three months—from January 23, 2003, when the 
abovementioned agreement was signed, to April 18, 2003, when the Ivorian 
government accepted ICC jurisdiction—strongly supports the claim that 
Gbagbo took all available measures not to share power with the rebellion by 
preventing already-appointed “rebel” ministers from claiming their seats in 
the cabinet.67  Gbagbo’s heuristic approach did not stop with the declaration 
of acceptance of ICC jurisdiction hastily faxed to the OTP.  Indeed, his 
government persisted in undermining the implementation of the power-
sharing agreement and eventually succeeded in September 2003, when the 
rebel leadership announced they had resigned and quit the unity government.68 
 
B. Uganda 
 
Uganda is the ideal case for this study because state leaders consistently 
preferred militaristic over political approaches to the LRA problem and 
behaved accordingly long before and after inviting ICC scrutiny.  The 
Ugandan government referred the situation concerning the LRA to the ICC 
prosecutor on December 16, 2003.69  There is a wealth of historical evidence 
on the Ugandan executive branch’s constant preference for a military 
approach to the LRA problem.70  Facing opposition at home,71 Museveni 
skillfully interpreted the changing geopolitical landscape and seized new 
opportunities provided by the “War on Terror.”72  His government reached an 
agreement with its Sudanese counterpart under American auspices and, as a 
result thereof, was granted permission to carry out military operations against 
LRA bases on a limited portion of Sudanese soil.73  This vast cross-border 
offensive, known as operation “Iron Fist,” ended in November 2003 with 
                                                 
Global Governance, 111 AFR. AFF. 1, 8, 15 (2012); Matthew I. Mitchell, Power-Sharing and Peace in Côte 
d’Ivoire: Past Examples and Future Prospects, 12 CONFLICT SECURITY & DEV. 171, 178–79 (2012). 
66 See Bocchese, supra note 2, at 377–79. 
67 On Gbagbo’s intentions to undermine the power-sharing agreement and hold on to power at all 
costs, see Englebert & Tull, supra note 10, at 126; COLLIER, supra note 62, at 162. For a detailed timeline, 
see Timeline Ivory Coast, TIMELINES HIST., http://timelines.ws/countries/IVORYCOAST.HTML. 
68 Bocchese, supra note 2, at 381. 
69 Akhavan, supra note 16, at 403; Rodman & Booth, supra note 2, at 271–72. 
70 See Rodman & Booth, supra note 2, at 281, 284, 290–91. 
71 In late 1999 the Ugandan Parliament passed a bill offering amnesty to all LRA members who de-
cided to renounce the rebellion and surrender. The Amnesty Act was enacted on January 21, 2000, in spite 
of Museveni’s opposition. Id. at 282. 
72 See id. at 283; DAVID BOSCO, ROUGH JUSTICE: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT IN A WORLD 
OF POWER POLITICS 96–97 (2014). 
73 Rodman & Booth, supra note 2, at 283; BOSCO, supra note 72, at 96–97. 
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mixed results. 74   Contrary to Museveni’s expectations, indeed, the LRA  
“appeared to make progress in late 2003 and the beginning of 2004.”75  Lastly, 
events that occurred after the self-referral, like operations “Iron Fist II” (2004) 
and “Lighting Thunder” (2008), 76  lend further support to the claim that 
Museveni treated peace talks merely as opportunities for the rebellion to 
surrender unconditionally.77 
 
On military inability, the balance of power was overwhelmingly in 
favor of the Ugandan People’s Defense Force (“UPDF”) in 2003.  With 40–
45,000 active members, 1800 paramilitaries, and around 3000 local 
militiamen, the UPDF confronted around 1500 LRA members, the majority 
of whom were based across the border in Sudan. 78   Furthermore, those 
numbers do not reflect considerations like military discipline, training, and 
equipment:  all factors further stacking the deck in favor of the UPDF.  Rather 
than a favorable balance of power, the two major factors impeding a decisive 
victory were the technology of rebellion and the Sudanese logistical and 
military assistance.  The latter impediment was overcome with the signing of 
a bilateral agreement between Kampala and Khartoum in March 2002, 
whereby the latter permitted the UPDF to cross into southern Sudan in order 
to attack LRA bases.79  As a result, the LRA could no longer enjoy safe haven 
across the border.80   Still, the technology of the rebellion is sufficient to 
explain why a well-trained and well-equipped state army has thus far been 
unable to decisively quash a rebel group composed mostly of child soldiers.81 
 
                                                 
74 See, e.g., Akhavan, supra note 16, at 417; Kasaija P. Apuuli, The ICC Arrest Warrants for the Lord’s 
Resistance Army Leaders and Peace Prospects for Northern Uganda, 4 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 179, 182 (2006); 
Frank Van Acker, Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army: The New Order No One Ordered, 103 AFR. AFF. 
335, 336 (2004). 
75 IISS 2004, supra note 61, at 223. 
76  On these military operations, see Valerie Freeland, Rebranding the State: Uganda’s Strategic Use 
of the International Criminal Court, 46 DEV. & CHANGE 293, 308 (2015). 
77 This is similar to Museveni’s actions in 1994 when, right before peace talks started, he “issued a 
deadline for the LRA’s unconditional surrender. In response, Kony relaunched the rebellion.” Christopher R. 
Day, The Fates of Rebels: Insurgencies in Uganda, 43 COMP. POL. 439, 449 (2011); see also Rodman & 
Booth, supra note 2, at 281. 
78 See IISS 2004, supra note 61, at 248. 
79 On Sudanese cooperation with Uganda’s operation “Iron First,” see Cecily G. Brewer, Peril by 
Proxy: Negotiating Conflicts in East Africa, 16 INT’L NEGOTIATION 137, 149 (2011). 
80 See James Bevan, The Myth of Madness: Cold Rationality and ‘Resource’ Plunder by the Lord’s 
Resistance Army, 9 CIV. WARS 343, 345 (2007). 
81 See id. at 343, 350, 354. On LRA’s guerrilla tactics, see Anthony Vinci, The Strategic Use of Fear 
by the Lord’s Resistance Army, 16 SMALL WARS & INSURGENCIES 360, 369 (2005). On LRA’s history of 
mass abduction and re-socialization of child soldiers, see Van Acker, supra note 74, at 338, 343. 
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C. The Democratic Republic of Congo 
 
The DRC’s political and military landscape in 2003–2004 was beyond 
chaotic.  On paper, the DRC armed forces (known by their French acronym 
“FARDC”) included some 60,000 soldiers and 3000 air force members.  They 
often worked in cooperation with the United Nations Mission in the DRC 
(“MONUC”), which deployed over 17,000 active troops and observers.82  
What these figures do not reveal, however, is that FARDC troops were in a 
dreadful state, as they “suffer[ed] from insufficient funding for food, salaries 
and equipment.” 83   In addition, the FARDC confronted two major 
rebellions—namely the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (“MLC”)84 
in the north and the Congolese Rally for Democracy (“RCD”)85 in the east—
whose common intents were to overthrow the government sitting in Kinshasa 
alongside several non-state thousand-unit-strong groups active at the local or 
regional level.86  While the MONUC contingent began to disarm warring 
factions in Ituri on February 18, 2004, this effort did not—and could not—
significantly affect the manpower factor by the time the government of 
Kinshasa invited ICC scrutiny over the entire national territory on March 3, 
2004.  But the balance of power between state and rebel forces was neither 
the only nor the most important obstacle impeding military victory for the 
FARDC.  All of the above-listed factors were present and carried explanatory 
weight:  rebels employed guerrilla tactics; foreign nations internationalized 
the conflict by assisting, when not directly creating, non-state armed groups; 
and the DRC’s immense territory made it virtually impossible for the 
government to project power onto remote regions.87 
                                                 
82 The Military Balance, 105 INT’L INST. FOR STRATEGIC STUD. 1, 375–76 (2005) [hereinafter IISS 
2005]. 
83 Id. at 362. 
84 Estimated strength was 18,000 units. IISS 2004, supra note 61, at 375. On the MLC, see Ndahinda, 
supra note 15. 
85 This was split into two main factions: the Congolese Rally for Democracy—Liberation Movement 
(“RCD-ML”), whose estimated strength ranged between 2000 and 3000 units; and the Congolese Rally for 
Democracy—Goma (“RCD-Goma”), whose strength was estimated around 20,000 units. IISS 2004, supra 
note 61, at 375; see also MAMPILLY, supra note 35, at 167–208. 
86 Some of these armed groups were active in the northeastern province of Ituri, often engaging in 
combat against one another, rather than fighting the FARDC. See IISS 2004, supra note 61, at 374–75; CHRIS 
ALDEN, MONIKA THAKUR & MATTHEW ARNOLD, MILITIAS AND THE CHALLENGES OF POST-CONFLICT 
PEACE: SILENCING THE GUNS 113–19 (2011). 
87 On foreign assistance to Congolese rebel groups, see MAMPILLY, supra note 35, at 167–208. On the 
challenges posed by geography, see HERBST, supra note 55, at 146–47. For more recent developments in the 
situation of eastern DRC, see John Karlsrud, The UN at War: Examining the Consequences of Peace-En-
forcement Mandates for the UN Peacekeeping Operations in the CAR, the DRC and Mali, 36 THIRD WORLD 
Q. 40, 44–45 (2015). 
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Given the grim political landscape and military reality his government 
confronted in early 2004, President Kabila had good reasons to play along 
with international efforts aimed at sharing power among key domestic players.  
Such players included his two main political rivals and former military 
opponents, RCD leader Azarias Ruberwa and MLC leader Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo.  Indeed, it would have been prudent for him to focus on consolidating 
power in Kinshasa and nearby provinces before—a concern that materialized 
on March 28, 2004, when government troops eventually warded off attacks 
against military installations and television headquarters in what was 
reportedly a coup attempt against him.88   Yet, as discussed elsewhere in 
greater detail, Kabila saw the ICC as a way to criminalize his former enemies 
and, in so doing, undermine the implementation of the foreign-sponsored 
power-sharing agreement.89  The plan of co-opting and subverting ICL norms 
and institutions exceeded expectations, for the MONUC contingent 
successfully pursued and apprehended several warlords beyond state reach.90 
 
D. The Central African Republic 
 
The government of Bangui referred the situation of its territory to the 
ICC on December 18, 2004.  General François Bozizé seized power in March 
2003 following five months of intense hostilities against the regime of Ange-
Félix Patassé and his allies, who included MLC rebels from the DRC as well 
as Chadian and Libyan mercenaries.91   This was Bozizé’s second known 
attempt to overthrow Patassé, having failed first in October 2002.92  At least 
initially, Bozizé claimed he was not seeking office,93 but merely helping the 
domestic transition toward free and fair presidential elections occurring in 
March 2005.94  Following a constitutional referendum held on December 5, 
2004, and approved by the vast majority of voters, the CAR system of 
government changed from presidential to semi-presidential and introduced the 
                                                 
88 A detailed timeline is available online at Timeline: Congo DRC, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
TIMELINES HIST., http://www.timelines.ws/countries/CONGO.HTML. 
89 See Bocchese, supra note 2, at 365–73. 
90 Id. at 373. 
91 See Owen Fiss, Within Reach of the State: Prosecuting Atrocities in Africa, 31 HUM. RTS. Q. 59, 61 
(2009); Ndahinda, supra note 15, at 488–89. 
92 Bozizé was also accused of involvement in a coup attempt against Patassé in October 2001, when 
he was serving as the army chief of staff for the latter. Following these allegations, Bozizé quickly fled the 
country and sought refuge in Chad. See Patrick Vinck & Phuong N. Pham, Outreach Evaluation: The Inter-
national Criminal Court in the Central African Republic, 4 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 421, 426 (2010). 
93 Debos, supra note 57, at 229 n.13. 
94 See Andreas Mehler, Rebels and Parties: The Impact of Armed Insurgency on Representation in the 
Central African Republic, 49 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 115, 126 (2011). 
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two-term limit for the presidency.95  The new constitution entered into force 
on December 27, 2004.96  On December 16, 2004—just two days before the 
self-referral—the highest functioning court in the country certified the CAR 
judiciary’s inability to investigate and prosecute former President Patassé and 
Congolese Vice-President Bemba Gombo as they were both in exile at that 
time.97  Because of this inability, the court “recommended referring the matter 
to the ICC.”98 
 
To nobody’s surprise, on January 4, 2005, Bozizé excluded his 
predecessor’s candidacy “on the grounds that [he was] being prosecuted for 
‘blood crimes and economic crimes.’”99  Patassé’s legal problems stretched 
beyond the CAR, for he “was a likely suspect in the ICC investigation in the 
CAR.”100  His death in 2011 may explain why a formal indictment never 
materialized, yet there is no doubt the troops under his command, along with 
their foreign allies, committed egregious human rights violations between 
2002 and 2003.101  Thus, the state invitation of ICC scrutiny causally follows 
the impossibility to apprehend Patassé, who had been in exile since March 
2003.102  In all, Bozizé was at a critical turning point of his journey to power 
at the time his government invited ICC scrutiny.  On the one hand, he sought 
the legitimacy of an electoral win to consolidate his authority;103 on the other 
hand, his main enemies escaped his reach and continued to pose a constant 
threat to his survival.104 
 
There is no doubt that Bozizé’s government was too weak to pursue any 
military option to enhance power consolidation in December 2004.  First, he 
                                                 
95 PETER BOUCKAERT & OLIVIER BERCAULT, STATE OF ANARCHY: REBELLION AND ABUSES AGAINST 
CIVILIANS, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 37–38 (2007), https://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/car0907/ 
car0907web.pdf. 
96  Id. at 37.  
97 Andreas Th. Müller & Ignaz Stegmiller, Self-Referrals on Trial: From Panacea to Patient, 8 J. INT’L 
CRIM. JUST. 1267, 1268 n.4 (2010). 
98 Id. 
99 BOUCKAERT & BERCAULT, supra note 95, at 38; see also Marlies Glasius, A Problem: Not a Solu-
tion: Complementarity in the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo, in THE IN-
TERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND COMPLEMENTARITY: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 1204, 1208 (Carsten 
Stahn & Mohamed El-Zeidy eds., 2011). 
100 Glasius, supra note 99, at 1206. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 1209–10. 
103 See Wasana Punyasena, Conflict Prevention and the International Criminal Court: Deterrence in a 
Changing World, 14 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 39, 64 (2006); BOUCKAERT & BERCAULT, supra note 95, at 37. 
104 See Steven D. Roper & Lilian A. Barria, State Co-Operation and International Criminal Court Bar-
gaining Influence in the Arrest and the Surrender of Suspects, 21 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 457, 467–68 (2008). 
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“came to power . . . thanks to Chadian mercenaries, and his rule . . .  hardly 
extend[ed] beyond the capital Bangui.”105  Second, his tenure in power was at 
best precarious, for his stay in power hinged on the protection provided by 
said Chadian mercenaries,106 foreign patronage, and ethnic politics.107  Third, 
his government was in control of neither the entire national territory—
northeast CAR had become the theater of clashes between Chadian state and 
rebel forces108—nor part of the abovementioned mercenaries, who, in April 
2004, “engaged in a skirmish with government forces in Bangui.”109  Finally, 
the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) estimated 
the CAR armed forces’ strength at 2550 men on active duty.110 
 
The CAR did not enjoy greater security under Bozizé, whose rule ended 
in late March 2013 when the rebel coalition Séléka captured the capital.  At 
that time the rebel coalition, whose estimated size reached 10,300 well-armed 
troops, enjoyed a favorable balance of power, counting on “more than double 
the total number of the Central African Armed Forces.” 111   Rather than 
bringing much-needed stability to the country, the rebel takeover plunged it 
into more violence and chaos.112  Widespread looting and rape by Séléka 
militants—predominantly Muslim northerners113—ignited resentment in the 
predominantly Christian population and led to the emergence of self-defense 
militias known as anti-Balaka.  Against this backdrop, on January 23, 2014 
the National Transitional Council (“CNT”) appointed non-partisan Bangui 
mayor Catherine Samba-Panza to the presidency. 114   Violence continued 
unabated under her rule, and on May 30, 2014, she signed the CAR’s second 
referral to the ICC.115  In the referral letter, she asked the ICC to investigate 
crimes committed in the country since August 2012 when the rebel coalition 
Séléka first emerged and began to organize.116 
                                                 
105 Jennifer Giroux et al., The Tormented Triangle: The Regionalisation of Conflict in Sudan, Chad, 
and the Central African Republic 9 (Crisis States Research Ctr., Working Paper No. 47, 2009). 
106 See Debos, supra note 57, at 227. 
107 See Giroux et al., supra note 105, at 9. 
108 Debos, supra note 57, at 228. 
109 Id. at 230. 
110 IISS 2005, supra note 82, at 371. 
111 Gino Vlavonou, Understanding the ‘Failure’ of the Séléka Rebellion, 23 AFR. SECURITY REV. 318, 
321 (2014). 
112 Id. at 322. 
113 Id. at 321. 
114  Martin Welz, Briefing: Crisis in the Central African Republic and the International Response, 113 
AFR. AFF. 601, 603 (2014). 
115  Government of the Central African Republic, Letter of Referral to the ICC (May 30, 2014) available 
at https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/2014-05-30-CAR-referral.pdf. 
116  Id. 
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In the months leading up to the referral, the security situation 
disintegrated into mayhem as sectarian tensions soured and former victims 
became perpetrators.  This latest wave of mass violence did not spare the 
capital Bangui.117  International military assistance notwithstanding,118 the 
sitting government proved unable to contain, let alone stop, ongoing 
bloodshed.  Massacres had sadly become a constant feature of life in the CAR 
well before Catherine Samba-Panza took office, and the month of May 2014 
was no exception.  On May 1, for example, fifteen people were killed near the 
border with Chad. 119   On May 5, unidentified gunmen attacked French 
peacekeepers.120  On May 9, the United Nations (“U.N.”) Security Council 
imposed sanctions on high-profile CAR nationals, including Séléka and anti-
Balaka leaders and former president Bozizé.121  Sanctions apparently failed to 
exert any constraining or deterring effects, for on May 10, armed men rounded 
up and burned thirteen people alive.122  Fearing spillover effects into their 
country, the Chadian government shut down its border with the CAR on May 
12.  On May 22, French peacekeepers confronted hundreds of Muslims who 
refused to disarm in Bambari.  French forces again engaged in combat with 
Séléka militants two days later.  On May 28, gunmen attacked a church in 
Bangui, killing at least seventeen people and abducting twenty-seven.  
Christian militiamen retaliated the following day by plundering a mosque in 
Bangui.123  On May 30—the day the referral letter was signed—Catherine 
Samba-Panza publicly stated that the armed groups’ aim was to destabilize 
her government.  The same day, Burundian peacekeepers clashed with 
protesters in the capital, killing two.124  Finally, on May 31, hundreds of 
Muslims took to the streets in Bangui to demand a safe exit from the capital.125  
In conclusion, the CAR is perhaps the easiest case to test the theoretical 
argument put forth herein, as state authority had collapsed and the acting 
government was unable to broadcast power over the capital city, let alone over 
the entire national territory. 
 
 
                                                 
117  Vlavonou, supra note 111, at 323. 
118 Id. 
119 A detailed timeline is available online at Timeline Central African Republic, TIMELINES HIST., 
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E. Mali 
 
The Mali self-referral aptly illustrates the logic underlying state 
invitation of external judicial scrutiny.  On March 22, 2012, the military 
removed two-term President Amadou Toumani Touré from power.126  This 
coup d’état took place five weeks before presidential elections were scheduled 
to take place.127  To justify its action, the military junta lamented Touré’s weak 
and half-hearted response against the new Tuareg rebellion (the National 
Movement for the Liberation of Azawad—“MNLA”) that had emerged in 
mid-January and had controlled the northern regions since that time.128  The 
situation further deteriorated on April 6, when the rebellion declared the 
independence of Azawad from Mali.129 
 
The military junta’s strategy was three-pronged.  First, by ousting the 
recalcitrant Touré, coup leaders sought to change state preferences in coping 
with the MNLA problem and adopt a more decisive military approach thereto.  
On this point, upon taking office on April 12, the new interim leader and 
former speaker of the parliament, Dioncounda Traoré, promised “total war” 
against the MNLA and newly formed Islamist groups claiming control of 
northern Mali.130 
 
Second, by inviting ICC scrutiny, Malian state authorities aimed to 
focus international attention on an otherwise peripheral conflict and 
criminalize the rebellion along with the Islamist groups.131  To this end, the 
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Malian government referred its own domestic situation dating back to January 
2012, thereby ensuring that ICC jurisdiction would cover war crimes and 
crimes against humanity allegedly committed—mostly by non-state actors—
in the six months immediately prior to the self-referral. 
 
Third, state efforts to criminalize internal enemies were crucial to 
forestall the African Union (“AU”) and ECOWAS’s attempts at finding a 
political solution to the crisis and convincing the military junta to relinquish 
power.132  By calling instead for the deployment of 3300 ECOWAS troops in 
November 2012 and also for French military intervention in December 2012, 
the Malian state invited an intervention that significantly altered the balance 
of power among the warring parties.133 
 
There was wide consensus among interim authorities on the need for 
French military intervention, due to the Malian state’s inability to quash the 
Tuareg rebellion at the time the interim government referred its situation to 
the ICC.134  The first factor contributing to its inability was an unfavorable 
balance of power.  Historically small and underfunded,135 the Malian army 
had an estimated strength of 7350 personnel, alongside 4800 paramilitaries 
and 3000 militiamen.136  When the MNLA emerged in January 2012, “Mali’s 
armed forces suffer[ed] from low morale, politicization and outdated 
equipment.”137  The air force—a key element of state military advantage over 
the rebellion—was small in size and only “intermittently capable of delivering 
limited strike capabilities.”138  The army was not faring any better, for it was 
reportedly forced to withdraw during clashes with the rebels due to 
ammunition shortages.139  Conversely, Tuareg tribesmen “had returned from 
fighting in Libya in possession of relatively sophisticated arms.”140  
  
The deployment of ECOWAS troops and French military intervention 
eventually redressed the balance of power but could not overcome the other 
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major factor currently at play in Mali: political geography.  Because of its 
shape, infrastructure, and population distribution, the Malian state has been 
unable to broadcast power onto the northern half of the country for decades.141  
Military officers are painfully aware of the adverse effects of political 
geography on a state’s ability to exert control over desert regions.  According 
to a high-ranking officer, “it is impossible, for States, like Mali and 
Mauritania, to insure an effective security of the region without the 
appropriate aerial surveillance equipment.  For the quasi-deliquescent Malian 
state, the situation is [even] worse.”142  In all, political geography, alongside 
the balance of power, explains why Mali has long been “characterized by vast 
state-less areas, particularly in the northern Tuareg-dominated regions.”143 
 
F. Ukraine 
 
The Government of Ukraine lodged its first declaration under Article 
12(3) on April 17, 2014, and a second one on September 8, 2015.  The latter 
was instrumental in extending the ICC’s temporal jurisdiction beyond the 
narrow time frame specified in the first declaration and to reaffirm Ukraine’s 
commitment to the ICC after democratically elected President Petro 
Poroshenko replaced acting President Oleksandr Turchynov.144 
 
At that time, the government, led by Prime Minister Arseniy 
Yatsenyuk, faced a dire domestic situation.  First, President Yanukovych—
the main suspect for ordering the police to break up protests in Independence 
Square (Maidan) on February 18, 2014 and the subject of an arrest warrant 
issued by the acting government on February 24—had fled the country and 
found refuge in Russia.145   Second, the March 16 referendum added the 
trappings of democratic legitimacy to Russia’s annexation of Crimea. 146  
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Third, in early April, government forces were struggling to reassert control 
over eastern provinces after pro-Russian separatists seized provincial 
administration buildings in eastern Ukraine’s major cities and proclaimed 
independence from Kiev.147 
 
Against this backdrop, Ukraine’s military response was timid at best.  
Prime Minister Yatsenyuk reiterated the government’s official position on 
March 5, 2014, claiming that the embattled Crimean peninsula must remain 
part of Ukraine. 148   Public announcements notwithstanding, skirmishes 
between Ukrainian and Russian forces took place repeatedly during the first 
half of March as the latter consolidated its hold on Crimea.149  On March 20 
and 22, pro-Russian crowds stormed Ukrainian military bases in Crimea, 
seizing two warships and capturing the commander of an air force base.150  On 
March 24, the government of Kiev de facto acknowledged defeat as it ordered 
the evacuation of its troops from the occupied peninsula.151  The situation in 
eastern Ukraine was dire, but the government “demonstrated resolve to restore 
its territorial integrity through the use of military force.”152  Russia’s stated 
intention not to invade eastern Ukraine and only unofficial support of the 
secessionists may partially explain this uneven resolve.153 
 
Unable to confront Russia militarily, Ukraine’s strategy has been an 
ode to institutional balancing by “counter[ing] pressures or threats through 
initiating, utilizing, and dominating multilateral institutions.” 154   Put 
otherwise, the government of Kiev switched the battlefield with diplomatic 
fora and international courts in hopes of raising the political costs of Russian 
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aggression.  On March 15, 2014, Russia vetoed a U.N. Security Council 
resolution declaring Crimea’s secession illegal.  While Russia fended off this 
attempt, China’s abstention signaled Moscow’s diplomatic isolation on the 
issue.155  On March 27, the U.N. General Assembly passed a non-binding 
resolution invalidating Crimea’s referendum and reaffirming Ukraine’s 
territorial integrity.156  Lacking the veto power to block this resolution, Russia 
nevertheless persuaded or threatened several countries not to back the 
resolution.157  As a result, the General Assembly’s half-hearted support for 
Ukraine’s territorial integrity could not be interpreted as a diplomatic success 
and called for further action.158  On April 17, the Government of Ukraine 
lodged an Article 12(3) declaration accepting ICC jurisdiction.159  The OTP 
quickly followed up and, on April 25, opened a preliminary examination of 
the situation in Ukraine.160 
 
On the eastern front, events took a positive turn after the election of 
Poroshenko to the presidency.  In late May, the Ukrainian army stepped up its 
military efforts against the separatists in the eastern provinces.161  Lack of 
popular support, poor coordination within the insurgency, eccentric 
leadership, and inadequate military training all contributed to the defeat of the 
rebellion by the Ukrainian military on May 26.162  Despite Russian assistance, 
the military balance of power unequivocally favored the Ukrainian military 
over the insurgency.  In response to the defeat, the Russian government 
allegedly provided the insurgents with advanced equipment, including anti-
aircraft weapons, and replaced the rebel leadership.163 
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Ukraine’s lawfare strategy began to pay dividends in November 2016 
when the OTP issued its yearly report on preliminary examination activities 
accusing Russian forces of having committed war crimes during and after the 
annexation of Crimea.164  In rejecting these allegations, Russian authorities 
symbolically unsigned the Rome Statute, alleging in turn that the Court is 
politically biased.165  Lastly, on January 16, 2017, Ukraine sued the Russian 
Federation before the International Court of Justice, accusing the latter of 
financing terrorism and discriminating against ethnic and religious minorities 
in Crimea.166  In conclusion, the imbalance of power between Ukrainian and 
Russian forces was such that the government of Kiev limited military violence 
to the bare necessities and instead explored alternative ways and means to 
contrast enemy action.  Having failed to garner enough political support at the 
U.N. level, lawfare became a tactic of last resort. 
 
G. Palestine 
 
The government of Palestine lodged two declarations accepting ICC 
jurisdiction under Article 12(3).  The first, submitted on January 22, 2009, 
granted the Court jurisdiction over acts committed on the territory of Palestine 
since July 1, 2002.167  The second, filed on January 1, 2015—one day before 
Palestine acceded to the Rome Statute—modeled the Court’s temporal 
jurisdiction and included crimes allegedly committed since June 13, 2014.168  
Both episodes squarely fit the theoretical argument herein set forth in that they 
bring to the fore the extralegal considerations underlying a government’s 
decision to invite external judicial scrutiny. 
 
January of 2009 saw intense hostilities in the Gaza Strip.  Israel’s 
military offensive, aimed at stopping rocket assaults against Israeli cities by 
                                                 
164 Int’l Criminal Court Office of the Prosecutor [hereinafter ICC-OTP], Report on Preliminary Exam-
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Hamas militants, reached its peak in early January after the Israeli Defense 
Forces (“IDF”) successfully carried out ground, air, and drone operations 
against Hamas leaders and targets, including weapon storages and smuggling 
tunnels.169   Israeli troops advanced into the Gaza Strip; Hamas militants 
retreated into urban centers.170  As war entered Palestinian cities, the civilian 
population became increasingly caught up in combat operations.  On January 
17, Israel agreed to a weeklong ceasefire, and Hamas militants followed suit 
the next day.171  The IDF concluded the three-week offensive on January 21 
when troops pulled out from the Gaza Strip.172 
 
The end of hostilities did not bring about lasting peace; rather, it moved 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict toward non-military avenues, including the 
ICC.173  It is worth noting the parties’ reaction to the end of combat operations, 
for both sides were concerned about the perceived external legitimacy of the 
military offensive that had just concluded.  On January 21, the Israeli foreign 
minister embarked on a diplomatic mission to Europe “in a bid to rally 
international support to end arms smuggling into the Hamas-ruled 
territory.”174   The Palestinians responded by lodging the abovementioned 
declaration under Article 12(3).175  By doing so, they purported to criminalize 
the same action the Israelis aimed to legitimize.  Furthermore, the choice of 
using international laws and institutions resonated with the intended audience, 
for European powers favor non-coercive alternatives to conflict resolution and 
staunchly support the ICC.176  That said, this first attempt at inviting ICC 
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scrutiny fell short of the Palestinians’ expectations as the crucial legal 
question revolved around the status of Palestine under international law.177  
After temporizing for more than three years, in April 2012, the ICC chief 
prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo declined Palestine’s referral to avoid taking 
a position on the thorny question of Palestinian statehood—a question he 
deemed appropriate for a political, rather than legal, organ to address and 
resolve.178 
 
On January 1, 2015, the government of Palestine lodged a second 
Article 12(3) declaration, accepting ICC jurisdiction retrospectively to June 
13, 2014.179  In the summer of 2014, the Gaza Strip became the unwilling 
stage of yet another episode of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict after the IDF 
launched Operation Protective Edge in response to sustained rocket fire from 
Gaza into Israel.180  This operation resulted in 51 days of intense hostilities 
and severely weakened Hamas.181  Still, the Israeli victory claimed a high 
civilian death toll:  2251 Palestinian casualties, of which 1462 were 
civilians. 182   The acceptance of an unconditional ceasefire by both sides 
officially ended the conflict on August 26, 2014, yet clashes continued in the 
following months due to, among other factors, the Israeli government’s 
approval of new settlements in East Jerusalem.183  On December 20, 2014, the 
IDF carried out the first air strike against a Hamas site in response to a rocket 
fired from Gaza into Israeli territory the day before.184  Another similar attack 
followed on December 24. 185   Clashes between Israeli policemen and 
Palestinian individuals continued on December 26 and 29, resulting in two 
                                                 
177 See Zimmerman, supra note 175, at 305. 
178 See BOSCO, supra note 72, at 173; Fisher & Stefan, supra note 6, at 247. 
179  ICC-OTP, supra note 164, at ¶ 111. 
180 See id., at ¶ 123; see also Matthew S. Cohen & Charles D. Freilich, The Delegitimization of Israel: 
Diplomatic Warfare, Sanctions, and Lawfare, 9 ISR. J. FOREIGN AFF. 29, 40 (2015). 
181  Gaza crisis: Toll of operations in Gaza, BBC WORLD NEWS (Sep. 1, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-28439404.  
182 U.N. Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Detailed Findings of the Indep. Comm’n of Inquiry Estab-
lished Pursuant to Human Rights Council Resolution S-21/1, ¶ 574, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/29/CRP.4 (June 24, 
2015); see also Bosco, supra note 173, at 160. 
183 Jeffrey Heller, Israel Claims West Bank Land for Possible Settlement Use, Draws U.S. Rebuke, 
REUTERS (Aug. 31, 2014), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-palestinians-israel-settlement/israel-claims-
west-bank-land-for-possible-settlement-use-draws-u-s-rebuke-idUSKBN0GV0D020140831. 
184 Israel Launches Gaza Air Strike on ‘Hamas Target,’ BBC NEWS (Dec. 20, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-30558922. 
185  Palestinian Killed in Clash with Israeli Troops near Gaza Border, REUTERS (Dec. 24, 2014), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-gaza-violence-idUSKBN0K20M520141224. 
678                           WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 27 NO. 3 
 
Israelis wounded and one Palestinian killed.186  On December 30, a draft 
resolution calling for the end of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and 
East Jerusalem and the establishment of a Palestinian state by 2017 was tabled 
before the U.N. Security Council but fell one vote short of the required 
majority.187  U.S. Permanent Representative to the U.N. Samantha Power 
criticized the draft resolution as an unproductive step toward a negotiated 
settlement, adding that the draft “sets the stage for more division, not for 
compromise.”188  President Mahmoud Abbas signed onto the Rome Statute of 
the ICC on December 31, and the following day his government lodged the 
abovementioned declaration under Article 12(3).189  It was immediately clear 
to all that Palestine’s accession to the Rome Statute was instrumental in 
exposing IDF leaders to prosecution for alleged war crimes and to heighten 
tension with the government led by Benjamin Netanyahu.190 
 
In all, this case study demonstrates that the logic of enemy 
criminalization applies to interstate and intrastate wars alike.  Cognizant of its 
military weakness vis-à-vis one of the most efficient armies in the world, the 
Palestinian leadership has long understood that the battlefield is not the 
optimal venue in which to redress its grievances against a militarily superior 
neighbor.  From this perspective, the ICC is simply the last in chronological 
order of a long list of external actors invited to intervene in—or interfere 
with—the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  As Samantha Power rightly pointed 
out, however, what distinguishes the ICC from other third parties is the 
expectation that its intervention will make externally sponsored conflict 
resolution efforts less likely to succeed. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
The concept of lawfare is moving away from the battlefield, where it 
once belonged, and toward more political avenues.  State leaders have realized 
the political potential of delegitimizing military enemies and political rivals 
by making them the targets of ICTs’ investigations and rulings.191  To earn the 
payoffs of inviting external judicial scrutiny, state leaders need not wait for a 
conviction beyond a reasonable doubt; formal indictments, arrest warrants, 
and reports submitted by U.N.-mandate commissions of inquiry and OTP 
statements tamper reputations when names are named.  As state leaders master 
the inner workings of the international criminalization processes, they 
successfully export lawfare outside the battlefield. 
 
The self-referrals submitted to the OTP by the Union of the Comoros 
(2013) and Gabon (2016) were excluded from the previous analysis on the 
grounds that their governments faced neither a conflict nor a post-conflict 
domestic scenario at the time they formally invited ICC scrutiny.  However, 
they deserve mention now, for they aptly illustrate the future directions of 
norm exploitation and subversion applied to ICL. 
 
These two self-referrals pertain to distinct levels of politics.  The one 
by the Comorian government relates to the country’s foreign policy, and it is 
thus far the only invitation of ICC scrutiny by a state party against non-party 
nationals. 192   The lack of information on the domestic decision-making 
process makes it only possible to speculate as to why the Union of the 
Comoros referred the Mavi Marmara incident to the ICC despite not having 
suffered tangible or intangible losses from said incident (merely on the ground 
that the attacked vessel flew a Comorian flag).193  That said, the incentive 
structure may help explain why the Union of the Comoros proved so eager to 
play a supporting role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  On the one hand, 
historians and political scientists have long discussed the economic 
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(un)viability of micro-states.194  On the other hand, a long history exists of 
Arab countries rewarding other states’ action against Israel.195 
 
The referral by the Gabonese government is purely a matter of domestic 
politics, for it concerns post-electoral violence allegedly incited by the losing 
presidential candidate.  Since presidential-election results were announced on 
September 3, 2016, indeed, re-elected Gabonese President Ali Bongo 
Ondimba has faced increasing internal and external opposition to his 
regime.196  On this point, the Gabonese diaspora has been remarkably active 
in shaming him before key foreign audiences, staging protests in Paris and 
New York, and even attracting the attention of the European Parliament.197  
Both the timing and the intended target of Gabon’s self-referral strongly 
suggest that President Bongo used the legal institute as a means to retaliate 
against his main rival and former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jean Ping, who 
contested the electoral results and led public protests before the Constitutional 
Court.198 
 
But how can legal scholars and experts account for the aforementioned 
shift in the means, ways, and avenues of norm exploitation and subversion?  
This evolution in lawfare is, to a significant extent, a byproduct of the ongoing 
reclassification of conduct formerly allowed under IHL as crimes against 
humanity.199  Relatedly, the fact that these crimes no longer require the so-
called “war nexus” opens a window of opportunity for state leaders to exploit 
in the co-optation of ICTs in criminalizing political rivals, and not just military 
enemies.  Civilian victimization is still—unfortunately—a recurring feature 
of the domestic politics of the countries falling under ICC scrutiny.  
Furthermore, civilian victimization is a strategy to which seemingly all actors 
resort, from incumbent governments (e.g., Côte d’Ivoire, Sudan-Darfur, 
Venezuela, Guinea, Kenya, and Burundi) to opposition parties (e.g., Kenya, 
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the CAR, and allegedly Gabon) and non-state actors uninterested in 
competing for political power by peaceful means (e.g., Nigeria and Mali).200  
Since civilian victimization defies the raison d’être of the laws of war—
sparing unnecessary human suffering and protecting civilians—the link 
between political violence and external judicial scrutiny is easy to grasp.  Put 
differently, deliberately targeting civilians in the pursuit of broader strategic 
goals almost inevitably amounts to a crime against humanity. 
 
After shedding light on state strategies of institutional co-optation and 
norm exploitation, the last remaining task is to lay out policy 
recommendations to contain, if not to reverse, this trend.  State use of 
international laws and courts in the furtherance of extralegal objectives 
undercuts the ICC’s work in a two-fold manner.  First, it negatively affects 
perceptions of justice and fairness, insinuating that the Court submits to state 
will and interests.201  Second, it impacts OTP decisions on resource allocation, 
for more preliminary examinations or official investigations do not 
necessarily carry along more financial contributions from state parties.  Thus, 
the OTP should receive state referrals with healthy skepticism, promises of 
cooperation notwithstanding.  In particular, the OTP must carefully gauge the 
pros and cons of self-referrals as opposed to those of proprio motu 
investigations.  The former assures friendlier state attitudes toward the Court 
and the prospect of greater cooperation but jeopardize perceptions of 
impartiality; the latter shield the Court from such negative perceptions but 
increase the risk of state confrontation and noncompliance.  In light of recent 
events, the OTP should resist the temptation of ignoring political 
considerations and dismissing the positive externalities stemming from self-
referrals.  Yet a policy favoring state cooperation over perceived impartiality 
will pay dividends in the short to medium run, while tampering the Court’s 
long-run reputation.  Thus, adopting such a policy would signal a dramatic 
shift in the OTP’s time horizon—from long- to short-term—for casting aside 
reputational concerns makes sense only if and when the outlook on the Court’s 
survival is negative. 
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